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Abstract: The so-called ‘re-identification condition’ (Kelly 2001) has played
an important role in the most prominent argument for nonconceptualism,
the argument from fineness of grain. A number of authors have recently argued
that the condition should be modified or discarded altogether, with devastating
implications for the nonconceptualist (see, e.g., Brewer 2005, Chuard 2006). The
aim of this paper is to show that the situation is even more dire for non-
conceptualists, for even if the re-identification condition remains in its original
form, the argument from fineness of grain still fails to make the case for
nonconceptualism. The paper’s central case rests on two claims: according to the
first, if the re-identification condition holds, then some beliefs will represent some
properties nonconceptually; and according to the second, if some beliefs repre-
sent some properties nonconceptually, the argument from fineness of grain fails
to make the case for nonconceptualism in any relevant sense. It follows that if
the re-identification condition holds, the argument from fineness of grain fails to
make the case for nonconceptualism.
The so-called ‘re-identification condition’ (Kelly 2001) has played an important
role in the most prominent argument for nonconceptualism, the argument from
fineness of grain.1 Very roughly, the condition states that in order for a subject S
to represent a property conceptually, S must have the ability to re-identify instances
of that property at different times.2 The argument from fineness of grain proceeds
to point out that perceptual experience often represents very fine-grained,
determinate properties—the particular green shade of a cactus, or its determinate
irregular shape—and that subjects are generally unable to re-identify these pro-
perties in the ways specified by the re-identification condition. Experience must
therefore represent these fine-grained, determinate properties nonconceptually.
A number of authors have recently expressed worries about the strength
and scope of the re-identification condition and have argued that it should be
modified or dispensed with altogether. This has unfortunate implications for
the nonconceptualist, since the argument from fineness of grain cannot succeed
once the condition has been weakened or discarded (see, e.g., Brewer 2005;
Chuard 2006). The aim of this paper is to show that the situation is even more
dire for nonconceptualists, for even if the re-identification condition remains in its
original form, the argument from fineness of grain still fails to make the case for
nonconceptualism. This paper argues, in other words, that the re-identification
condition actually serves to undermine the conclusion of the argument it
purports to support.
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The paper’s central case rests on two claims defended in Section 2: according
to the first, if the re-identification condition holds, then some beliefs will represent
some properties nonconceptually; and according to the second, if some beliefs
represent some properties nonconceptually, the argument from fineness of grain
fails to make the case for nonconceptualism in an important sense. It follows that
if the re-identification condition holds, the argument from fineness of grain fails
to make the case for nonconceptualism.
A point of clarification: the aim of this paper isn’t to argue against non-
conceptualism but rather to show that the argument from fineness of grain
cannot be used to make the case for nonconceptualism even if the re-identification
condition remains unmodified. This suggests that nonconceptualists should
shift their focus away from arguments relying on the condition entirely and
attempt instead to develop and strengthen other arguments for their view.3 The
paper begins with a background discussion, in Section 1, of the fineness of grain
argument and the re-identification condition; it ends, in Section 3, with the
consideration and rejection of replies on behalf of the nonconceptualist.
1. Experience and Re-identification
1.1 The Conceptual/Nonconceptual Debate
The debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists has been notoriously
difficult to navigate, in part because it involves two distinct debates which
weren’t carefully distinguished until recently (see Heck 2000; Byrne 2003; 2005;
Speaks 2005). Though these two debates have the same goal, namely to deter-
mine the degree to which experiential states are like belief states, their empha-
ses are quite different. The so-called ‘content’ debate is concerned, as its name
suggests, with contents4: its proponents disagree about whether belief and
experiential states have contents of the same kind. Content-conceptualists claim
that experience and belief do have contents of the same kind—in other words, the
content of an experience is of such a kind that it could be the content of a belief.
Content-nonconceptualists, meanwhile, deny that experience and belief have
contents of the same kind. Since it is widely assumed that concepts are the sole
constituents of belief contents, the debate is often described as pitting those who
claim that experiential contents, like belief contents, take concepts (and concepts
only) as constituents—i.e., the content-conceptualists—against those who claim
that experiential contents, unlike belief-contents, have (at least some) constituents
that aren’t concepts—i.e., the content-nonconceptualists.
By contrast, the so-called ‘state’ debate is concerned with the relation between
the tokening of a state (belief or experience) and concept-possession. Its partici-
pants disagree specifically about whether concept-possession is a necessary
condition for the tokening of relevant experiences. Since it is widely assumed, in
this debate, that possessing the concept RED (i.e., being able to token a belief
with the conceptual constituent RED) is a necessary condition for having a belief
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that a tomato is red, the debate can be described as pitting those who claim
that possessing the relevant concepts is a necessary condition for tokening the
relevant experience—i.e., state-conceptualists—against those who deny that this is
the case—i.e., state-nonconceptualists.5
It is important to note that the two debates are not equivalent. The truth
of state-nonconceptualism does not entail the truth of content-nonconceptualism.
To see this, assume state-nonconceptualism is true; e.g., assume that being able to
think a thought with the concept RED is not a necessary condition for tokening
an experience of red. A thinker may therefore undergo an experience of red and
yet be unable to token a belief whose content includes the concept RED. This fact
does not entail the truth of content-nonconceptualism: it does not entail, that is,
that the content of an experience of red is of a different kind from the content of
belief. That our thinker is unable to token a belief with the concept RED doesn’t
entail that the content of her experience of red is such that it could not possibly
be believed. In fact, the truth of state-nonconceptualism entails nothing at all
about how experience represents the property of redness.6,7
Perhaps unsurprisingly, most philosophers purport to contribute to the
content debate, even when they unwittingly contribute to the state debate. Tye’s
(2000) fineness of grain argument, for instance, turns out to be an argument for
state-conceptualism. Since subjects often have experiences that represent shades
of colour, like red17, without having stored mental representations of them—
and since having a stored mental representation of a property such as red17 is
required to possess the concept RED17—Tye concludes that experience is non-
conceptual. As Byrne (2003) and Speaks (2005) both point out, Tye’s argument
here and arguments like it show at most that possessing a concept like RED17 is
not a necessary condition for experiencing the property it picks out, i.e., red17.
Such an argument, in other words, ‘establishes at best the state view’ (Byrne
2003: 17). Byrne adds:
For all this argument says, a subject’s visual experience might have the
content that, say, a certain tomato is red19, where the proposition that the
tomato is red19 is the very same kind of proposition—a Fregean Thought,
perhaps—that she can believe. (ibid.)
Despite all this, Tye indeed seems to hold the content view. After all, it is the
content view (which Tye explicitly attempts to defend in later work, e.g., Tye
2006) that makes sense of Tye’s overarching project and of projects like his which
aim to explain the phenomenology of experience in terms of experiential contents.8
It is also the content debate—and not the state debate—whose outcome seems to
bear on the epistemological question that leads a number of philosophers to the
debate: a question about how experiential states can ever justify belief states
if their contents are of different kinds9 (see, e.g., Brewer 1999; 2005; Dokic and
Pacherie 2001; McDowell 1994). As a result, the discussion in this paper will
be located within the content debate and its focus will be the version of the
argument from fineness of grain that constitutes an argument for content-
nonconceptualism.10 In the remainder of the paper, the terms ‘conceptualism’
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and ‘nonconceptualism’ should be understood as standing for ‘content-
conceptualism’ and ‘content-nonconceptualism’.
1.2 The Re-identification Condition
The argument from fineness of grain appeals to a so-called ‘re-identification
condition’—a condition which must be met if a subject is to represent a
particular perceptual property conceptually.11 Chuard (2006) provides a detailed
discussion of the various re-identification conditions deployed in the literature.
The focus here will be on a version of the condition that is most likely to ensure
that the argument from fineness of grain is valid. That version of the re-
identification condition—which I’ll call RC—can be stated as follows (this is an
extension of Chuard’s 2006 formulation12):
(RC) For any perceptual property p to be represented by a subject S
using a concept C, S must be able to:
(i) identify some object as having p at some time t;
(ii) identify some object as having p at time t + 1;
(iii) be aware that the property p identified at t + 1 is the same property
p identified at t
(iv) re-identify p at t + 1 as the same property p perceived at t based
only on the experience and memory of p; and
(v) t and t + 1 must be separated by an interval during which S has no
experience of p.
To see the condition at work, imagine that a subject, Lisa, is attending to a canvas
sprinkled with drops of green paint and is focusing her attention on a drop
which has a particular, determinate colour property, say green17.13 According to
RC, in order for Lisa’s experience to represent this property of the paint-drop
conceptually, Lisa must first be able to (i) identify the drop as being green17 at
t, and then (ii) identify that drop (or another drop) as being green17 at some later
time t + 1. The third condition requires that Lisa realize, when she perceives the
drop as being green17 at t + 1, that this is the very same property she perceived
the drop as having earlier, at t.14 And, indeed, this is what we typically require
for re-identification in ordinary cases: subjects who fail to notice that the
property they are now perceiving is the same one they were perceiving earlier
are not usually said to have re-identified it. In other words, for Lisa to meet the
Re-identification Condition, she must (iii) be aware that the two properties
she attributes to the drops at t and t + 1 are the same property green17. This isn’t
enough, however. For, intuitively speaking, it seems that were Lisa to notice, at
t, that the drop she’s attending to is the third one from the bottom left corner
of the canvas, and were she to re-identify the shade at t + 1 by counting the drops
from the bottom left corner, she would fail to meet RC. Indeed, if Lisa must rely
on information about the location of the paint drop (or its size, shape, etc.) in
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order to make a judgement about its colour, it seems that she is not actually
re-identifying the colour itself. Our intuitions suggest that genuine re-
identification of a given perceptual property should be based on a subject’s
experience of that property at some time t + 1 together with the perceptual
memory of that property which was perceived earlier. In other words, in order for
Lisa to truly re-identify green17 in the way specified by RC, she must rely on her
experience of a particular shade and her memory of said shade only.
Finally, were Lisa to look at the green17 drop and keep her gaze focused on that
very drop as the canvas was moved across the studio before re-identifying the
shade, she would not necessarily meet RC either. Indeed, she must be able to close
her eyes, or look away or in some other way (v) stop experiencing the shade in
question in order to meet the condition.15 It is worth pointing out, as Kelly (2001)
himself does, that the length of the interval between t and t + 1 can be quite short.
Clearly, RC cannot require that one be able to re-identify a property five or ten
years after having experienced it. But as long as the experience of the property
can be interrupted while subjects retain the capacity to re-identify it, they will
have met (v). Note that the fact that RC requires re-identification of a property
after an interval of no experience, however short, suggests that it requires the
storage in memory (at time t) of relevant representations and the retrieval at t + 1
of these representations. Condition (iv) specifies that it is a representation of the
relevant property (of the shade green17 in Lisa’s case) that must be stored and
retrieved, as opposed to representations of the location (or size, shape, etc.) of an
individual object that instantiates that property.16
RC, as described above, has struck a number of writers as a rather intuitive
condition on perceptual (or observational) concepts, like GREEN and ROUND.
Chuard writes that:
most participants in the dispute, we can assume, agree that something
like [RC] governs the possession of normal non-demonstrative concepts
like red, car, kangaroo, etc. . . . At first sight, this is not implausible: we
often interpret failures to re-identify red things as evidence that a subject
has no concept for redness. (Chuard 2006: 170)
Similarly, Dokic and Pacherie claim that:
it seems plausible to suppose that mastery of an observational concept
implies a capacity to identify and re-identify perceptual instances of the
concept. This means that, to have a concept of a given colour shade,
one must be able to recognize coloured objects over time. (Dokic and
Pacherie 2001: 197–8)
And even some conceptualists take there to be such a condition on perceptual
concepts. McDowell, in an oft-quoted passage, says:
what ensures that it is a concept, what ensures that thoughts that exploit
it have the necessary distance from what would determine it to be true,
is that the associated [recognitional] capacity can persist into the future,
if only for a short time . . . (McDowell 1994: 57)
Belief, Re-identification and Fineness of Grain 233
© 2012 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Of course, however plausible RC may be as a condition on some general
perceptual concepts, like GREEN, or CAR, it is clearly not a plausible condition
on all concepts. First, it is clearly not a condition on concepts that pick out
imperceptible properties, such as the concept JUSTICE.17 Second, RC is not a
condition on concepts that pick out perceptual properties deferentially.18 After all,
it seems clear that it is possible for thinkers to represent objects conceptually
without being able to identify—let alone re-identify—them, so long as thinkers
defer to experts about the referents of these concepts.
1.3 The Argument from Fineness of Grain
The argument from fineness of grain takes the re-identification condition as a
premise, along with three other claims, and it can be schematized as follows:
[P1] RC: In order for a subject S to represent a property p conceptually,
S must be able to re-identify p as specified in (i)–(v) above.
[P2] Subjects represent fine-grained properties, like green17, in
experience.
[P3] Subjects do, or could, lack the ability to re-identify these properties
as specified in (i)–(v).
[P4] Subjects do not represent fine-grained properties in experience
deferentially.
Therefore,
[C1] Subjects do not represent fine-grained properties in experience
conceptually.
Therefore,
[C2] Experiential content is unlike the content of belief in that it is at
least partly nonconceptual.19
Premises [P2], [P3] and [P4] are supposed to be fairly uncontroversial. Interest-
ingly, [P3] can be understood as making either of two claims. The first is an
empirical claim, to the effect that human subjects are quite bad at re-identifying
fine-grained properties (see, e.g., Raffman 1995). Some of the empirical evidence
supporting such a claim is anecdotal, drawing from familiar scenarios (not
unlike the one above) involving rows of paint chips in hardware stores. Most
subjects are, indeed, unable to re-identify, based on current experience and
memory of its shade alone, a colour they’d picked out as a good candidate
for a bedroom wall just seconds earlier. But arguments from fineness of grain
need not depend on the truth of these empirical claims and [P3] need not be
interpreted as such. Indeed, some arguments from fineness of grain (including
Kelly’s (2001) argument) appeal primarily to the fact that it is (naturally) possible
for a human subject’s experience to represent a property she couldn’t
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re-identify.20 Given that re-identification depends crucially on memory, all that is
needed is the (natural) possibility that a thinker have a memory bad enough that
she be unable to re-identify some fine-grained properties her experience repre-
sents. This is all the argument from fineness of grain requires, for it will follow,
then, that human experience is a kind of state which, unlike belief, can have
constituents that aren’t concepts.
[P4], which claims that experience does not represent properties deferentially,
is not usually made explicit in statements of the argument, possibly because it
seems so obviously true as to be barely worth stating. Indeed it seems clearly
true that we could not—in experience—defer to experts about what we experi-
ence. Still, for the purposes of this paper, it is worth highlighting the fact
that RC—in its ‘original’ form—entails that someone who cannot re-identify a
property must represent it nonconceptually only if we can rule out other ways of
conceptually representing the property in question.
1.4 Fineness of Grain and Demonstratives
Conceptualists are fond of blocking arguments from fineness of grain by
appealing to demonstrative concepts. The move can be construed as a state-
conceptualist move against state-nonconceptualism, motivated by the observa-
tion that even if experience does indeed represent fine-grained properties for
which subjects possess no general, context-independent concepts, still the sub-
jects of experience may possess context-dependent, demonstrative concepts of
these fine-grained properties. The problem with the argument from fineness of
grain (for state-nonconceptualism) therefore seems to be that it takes ‘an unduly
restrictive view of concepts as necessarily corresponding to entirely context-
independent classifications of things’ (Dokic and Pacherie 2001), forgetting
meanwhile the existence of context-dependent demonstrative concepts.21 State-
conceptualists conclude that fineness of grain arguments fail to establish the
falsity of their view: these arguments fail to show that the possession of some
concept (context-independent or not) is not in fact a necessary condition for
tokening an experience representing the concept’s fine-grained referent.
Of course, the focus of this paper is on the content-nonconceptualist argument
from fineness of grain, and content-conceptualists too may want to appeal to
demonstrative concepts to diffuse that version of the argument. Indeed a
content-conceptualist may argue that it seems possible for fine-grained proper-
ties to be represented by a subject S conceptually without the subject either
meeting RC or tokening a deferential concept, if S represents these properties
demonstratively.22 Conceptualists may think that the argument for content-
nonconceptualism also takes a restrictive view of concepts, assuming that
concepts either must meet RC or must be deferential. If, however, a subject can
represent fine-grained properties using demonstrative concepts without meeting
RC, the conclusions of the argument from fineness of grain stated above simply
do not follow from its premises [P1]–[P4].
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Interestingly, of course, the goal of Kelly’s (2001) paper is precisely to argue
that RC is a condition on perceptual demonstrative concepts.23 The fact that we
can use general concepts deferentially leads Kelly to urge caution when applying
the condition to general perceptual concepts, however plausible such an appli-
cation may seem. He writes:
if it is possible to possess a general concept in virtue of one’s capacity
to defer to an expert user of terms that express that concept, then it
will be possible to possess the concept without being able to satisfy the
re-identification condition. (Kelly 2001: 407)
But, Kelly adds, ‘this consideration isn’t relevant in the case of demonstrative
concepts’ (ibid.). He concludes that RC is a condition on perceptual demonstra-
tive concepts which entails, it would seem, that the argument from fineness of
grain is valid after all. For if RC holds as a condition on perceptual demonstra-
tives, then the conceptualist is wrong when she argues that subjects who don’t
meet RC could represent fine-grained properties in experience using demon-
strative concepts. Experience must therefore represent fine-grained properties
nonconceptually.24
2. Belief and Re-identification
Critics of the argument from fineness of grain usually deny that RC is a
condition on demonstrative concepts. These critics claim that RC requires too
much, and that it is possible for subjects to represent properties using demon-
strative concepts even if they don’t meet the condition. Brewer (2005) suggests,
for instance, that requiring an interval of no experience is not needed: if a thinker
can track a fine-grained property as environmental conditions change—as Lisa
would be able to do if she kept her attention focused on the relevant drop while
the canvas was moved—then the thinker should count as representing the
property using a demonstrative concept.25 Chuard (2006) also argues that RC as
originally formulated simply cannot be a condition on demonstrative concepts.
This section of the paper attempts to show that even if we grant that RC is in fact
a condition on demonstrative concepts, the argument from fineness of grain still
fails to make the case for nonconceptualism. The argument proceeds in two
steps. According to the first, if RC holds, some belief-contents will have non-
conceptual constituents (Section 2.1); according to the second, if some belief-
contents have nonconceptual constituents, the argument from fineness of grain
fails to make the case for nonconceptualism (Section 2.2).
2.1 Belief and Fineness of Grain
We begin by considering what RC, as originally formulated, entails about beliefs
that represent fine-grained properties. Imagine, then, that our subject Lisa is
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attending to the shade of the green17 paint-drop. As we did earlier, let us
stipulate that Lisa does not meet RC. According to the nonconceptualist, this
entails that Lisa’s experience isn’t representing green17 using a demonstrative (or
any) concept. Now imagine that while attending to green17, Lisa comes to utter
the following English sentence:
(S1) This is the perfect shade for my poster.
The belief that (S1) expresses, in this case, represents a fine-grained property
(green17). However, assuming that RC is a condition on demonstrative concepts
will entail that the belief expressed by Lisa with (S1) cannot represent green17
using a demonstrative concept. Indeed we stipulated that Lisa does not meet
RC, and it is this very fact that enables the nonconceptualist to argue that her
experience doesn’t represent green17 using a demonstrative concept. If RC holds,
then it follows not only that Lisa’s experience cannot represent green17 using a
demonstrative concept, but that the belief she expresses with the demonstrative
sentence (S1) does not represent green17 using a demonstrative concept either.
The exact reasoning which led the nonconceptualist to conclude that Lisa’s
experience does not represent green17, leads to the conclusion that Lisa’s belief
cannot represent green17 using a demonstrative concept.
Moreover, since we are assuming that RC holds as originally formulated, we
are assuming that it is a condition on perceptual demonstrative concepts and
on non-deferential perceptual concepts, such as GREEN or ROUND. This means
that since Lisa doesn’t meet RC, her belief cannot represent green17 using a
perceptual demonstrative, or a non-deferential perceptual concept. And though
it isn’t absurd to suppose that Lisa represents green17 deferentially when she
tokens the belief she expresses with (S1), it does seem highly implausible that
this would be the case. For the constituent of the belief-content corresponding
to Lisa’s demonstrative expression ‘this’ does not pick out green17 based on her
capacity to defer to experts about colour shades. Were all color experts to vanish,
or had they never existed, Lisa could still manage to refer to that very shade of
green—for she picks it out based on her capacity to focus her attention on the
relevant property and demonstrate it.
What, then, are we to say about the belief Lisa expresses with (S1)? It would
seem that Lisa’s belief simply cannot be representing the fine-grained shade she
demonstrates using 1) a deferential concept (she’s not relying on experts), 2) a
non-deferential perceptual concept (RC isn’t met) or 3) a perceptual demonstra-
tive concept (RC isn’t met). Reasoning as the nonconceptualist did in the
argument from fineness of grain, we should conclude that Lisa’s belief must
represent the shade in question nonconceptually. In other words, if RC holds, then
some belief-contents will have constituents that are not concepts.
Notice that to claim that belief-contents may have nonconceptual constituents
isn’t necessarily unreasonable. It does go against the general assumption in the
‘content’ debate that concepts, and concepts only, are the constituents of belief.
However it isn’t clear what motivates the claim that concepts are the only
possible constituents of belief. After all, regardless of one’s ontology, concepts
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will turn out to be ‘objects’ (mental representations or abstract constituents
of propositions) of a certain kind, where the kind in question remains to be
delineated.26 It is possible, of course, to delineate the relevant kind in such a way
as to guarantee that they are the only possible constituents of belief-contents.
After all, it is possible to simply assert that any constituent of belief is thereby
a concept regardless of what other features it may have. This leaves open the
possibility that some of these concepts could be the constituents of experiential
contents, even as it rules out the possibility that belief-contents could have
nonconceptual constituents. But such a characterization is quite empty, since it
fails to identify any interesting, or salient, features of concepts as a kind. It is no
wonder, then, that concepts are never actually characterized this way. Instead
concepts are claimed to be objects with certain sorts of salient features, and this
leaves open the possibility that some constituents of belief-contents may not have
the requisite features. Of course, RC is just such a characterization of concepts.27 It
shouldn’t be especially surprising, therefore, that if RC is in fact a condition on
concepts, then some constituents of belief-contents may not be concepts. Accord-
ing to RC, concepts are objects which meet (i)–(v) above, and though these are
indeed features that many constituents of belief-contents will possess, it is by no
means necessary that every constituent of belief-contents must meet RC.
Now, as a condition on non-deferential perceptual and demonstrative
concepts, RC is a condition on these concepts (‘objects’) generally, regardless of
whether they happen to be constituents of belief- or experiential contents. For
a subject to represent a property using a (nondeferential perceptual or demon-
strative) concept, whether in experience or in belief (or really in any other state)
the constituents of her experiential or belief-content must possess the relevant
features. Conversely, a subject whose representational constituents lack the
relevant features will not represent the relevant properties using a concept
whether in the content of experience or in that belief. Those who endorse RC in
its original form, as proponents of the argument from fineness of grain seem
to do, should be willing to accept that some of the constituents of belief-contents
may not technically be concepts. And this is precisely what nonconceptualists
would have to say about beliefs expressed by sentences like (S1): Lisa,
in tokening these beliefs, is representing the fine-grained property green17
nonconceptually.
One last observation: this may cohere nicely with recent accounts of demon-
strative thoughts—for instance, Levine (2010)—according to which the key
demonstrative constituents of these thoughts are pointers.28 The role of these
pointers, according to Levine, is to select a bit of another mental representation
(say a visual perceptual one) and to use it to represent the world. On such
accounts, when one utters a sentence like (S1), the demonstrative expression
expresses a pointer, a mental constituent which directs attention to the visual
representation of the green shade and, using that visual representation, succeeds
in picking out the shade represented visually. Most importantly, since demonstra-
tive constituents of beliefs expressed by sentences like (S1) are thought to be
pointers whose content will change depending on the direction of attention, they
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are unlikely to be the sorts of things that can be stored in memory. In other words,
pointers may not meet RC and they may therefore be, in some sense, nonconceptual
constituents of belief. In any case, it looks as though RC, in its original form, entails
that some beliefs will represent some fine-grained properties nonconceptually.
2.2 Making the Case for Nonconceptualism
Though I just argued, in the preceding section, that there is nothing inconsistent
about claiming that some belief-contents have some nonconceptual constituents,
this fact does ultimately undermine the case for nonconceptualism. Indeed, the
‘content’ debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists as described
earlier is a debate about whether experience and belief have the same kind
of contents. This entails that for any argument to truly be an argument for
content-nonconceptualism, it must show not only that experience at least some-
times represents the world using constituents that aren’t concepts but also that
belief does not. It is no wonder, then, that proponents in the content debate
generally assume that belief-contents take concepts and concepts only as
constituents—for this assumption ensures that if some of the constituents of
experiential contents are not concepts, then experience will indeed be unlike
belief in the relevant respect. However, as the previous section suggests, endors-
ing RC in its original form undermines the ‘content’ debate’s general assumption
about belief, because if RC holds, some constituents of belief-contents may not
be concepts. The fact that some constituents of experience are not concepts now
fails to entail that belief- and experiential contents have constituents of different
kinds. Indeed, if RC holds in its original form, then the argument from fineness
of grain’s first conclusion [C1]—according to which subjects do not represent
fine-grained properties in experience using concepts—does not entail [C2]—that
experience is unlike belief in that it is at least partly nonconceptual. In other words,
though RC as originally stated plays a crucial role in getting the nonconceptu-
alist to show that experience represents some properties nonconceptually, it
simultaneously prevents the nonconceptualist from making the case that expe-
rience is unlike belief in this respect.
Nonconceptualists may suggest, in response, that RC should be slightly
modified to avoid this conclusion—as long as it is modified in the right way.29
They may insist, for instance, that it is possible for a subject to meet RC—to
represent a fine-grained property conceptually—so long as she is able to
re-identify the relevant property based on her perceptual experience and
memory of the shade together with any other information she might have, such
as information about the location of objects. If RC requires re-identification of
this weaker kind, then nonconceptualists can deny that the content of the belief
Lisa expresses with (S1) must have a constituent that is not a concept, since Lisa
now meets RC. Unfortunately, no such move can succeed, for two reasons. First,
if RC is modified so as to ensure that Lisa meets it, the nonconceptualist will
indeed be able to deny that she must represent green17 nonconceptually in
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thought, but it will also entail that Lisa’s experience could represent green17
conceptually. Second, after RC is modified, it is possible to re-describe Lisa in
a way that guarantees that she fails to meet it. Lisa’s memory only need be bad
enough, and she will fail to re-identify a particular shade based on the modified
criteria. In such a re-described case, the modified RC will entail Lisa could not
represent green17 conceptually whether in experience or in thought, hence failing
to entail that experience and thought have contents of different kinds. This
highlights, once more, a crucial feature of RC, namely the fact that it is a
condition on concepts generally—regardless of whether they figure in experiential
or in belief-contents. This suggests that nonconceptualists face a dilemma. Either
RC is characterized in such a way that it entails that experience represents
fine-grained properties nonconceptually, in which case it will also entail that
belief represents some fine-grained properties nonconceptually; or RC is charac-
terized so as to ensure that subjects who represent fine-grained properties in
thought meet RC; i.e., that they represent said properties conceptually. Either way,
however, we have no reason to conclude that the contents of experience and
belief are different kinds of contents; i.e., RC fails to support nonconceptualism.
3. Objections and Replies
The argument just presented depends on two crucial claims which may right-
fully be called into question by proponents of the argument from fineness of
grain. The first concerns the very structure of the debate between conceptualists
and nonconceptualists. Indeed, I have assumed that making the case for non-
conceptualism requires making the case that experience and belief have contents
of different kinds. A nonconceptualist may object that I have mischaracterized
the debate. Second, I have assumed that perceptual properties can be represented
conceptually in three ways: either using a non-deferential perceptual concept,
or using a deferential concept, or using a perceptual demonstrative. One may
argue, however, that I have failed to consider the possibility that perceptual
properties could be represented conceptually using complex descriptions, such
as, e.g., THE SHADE I’M LOOKING AT. I end the paper by considering these two
objections and showing why they fail to provide a compelling defence of the
nonconceptualist’s argument from fineness of grain.
3.1 The Conceptual/Nonconceptual Debate
As mentioned in Section 1, the paper assumes that the debate between concep-
tualists and nonconceptualists is essentially a debate about the content of
experience and belief. However, the paper further assumes that the goal of the
content debate is to make a comparative claim concerning these contents, with the
nonconceptualist claiming that a) experiential and belief-contents are contents
of different kinds, and the conceptualist claiming that a*) experiential and
Bénédicte Veillet240
© 2012 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
belief-contents are of the same kind. Unfortunately, it seems possible to grant that
the conceptual/nonconceptual debate is essentially a debate about content while
denying the centrality of these comparative claims. The nonconceptualist may
primarily hope to show that b) some of the constituents of experience are not
concepts, while the conceptualist may primarily aim to argue that b*) all the
constituents of experience are concepts. It is true that these claims about
experiential contents will entail further comparative claims when considered in
tandem with additional claims about the constituents of belief-contents. But why
assume, as this paper has, that the main goal of the debate is to settle the truth
of the comparative claims a) and a*) and not to settle the truth of the claims
about experience b) and b*)?30
The point can be put into sharper focus if we acknowledge the fact that some
nonconceptualists may not be very interested in establishing the truth of the
comparative claim which I maintain their argument from fineness of grain aims
to support. Such a nonconceptualist may be perfectly happy to believe instead
that a*) experiential and belief-contents are of the same kind, or to remain entirely
uncommitted when it comes to the truth of comparative claims like a) and a*).
What makes her a nonconceptualist nonetheless is the sole fact that she believes
that b) some of the constituents of experience are not concepts. Such a noncon-
ceptualist does not, at this juncture, have any reason to think that the argument
from fineness of grain and its re-identification condition have failed her. For all
I have argued here, endorsing the re-identification condition prevents those
nonconceptualists who hope to establish the truth of the claim that experiential
and belief-contents are contents of different kinds from reaching their conclusion.
It does nothing, however, to undermine a more modest nonconceptualist whose
only nonconceptualist goal is to argue that b) some of the constituents of
experiential contents are not concepts.
The point is well taken. The argument in this paper does not entail that the
argument from fineness of grain undermines the ‘modest’ nonconceptualist.
However, it seems that most nonconceptualists are not in fact so modest. Most
nonconceptualists are, whether they realize it or not, interested in defending the
truth of a) that experiential and belief-contents are contents of different kinds.
Most nonconceptualists, then, will find that endorsing the re-identification
condition will prevent them from using the argument from fineness of grain
to make their case. Indeed, as I’ll argue now, a review of some of the most
prominent nonconceptualist arguments suggests that nonconceptualists are moti-
vated by the existence of contrasts between belief and experience which in turn
primarily support the comparative conclusion that experiential and belief-
contents are contents of different kinds. This comparative claim will of course
have implications about the constituents of experiential contents given further
assumptions about the nature of belief-contents. Still, given the arguments they
provide, it seems that it is the relation between experiential and belief-contents
which concerns nonconceptualists the most.
Consider, first, the various arguments for nonconceptualism that emphasize
features of experience that are not features of belief. These arguments (which
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include the argument from fineness of grain) emphasize quite explicitly differ-
ences between belief and experiential states. For instance, they highlight the fact
that experience, unlike belief, can represent contradictory or impossible states of
affairs (see, e.g., Crane 1988), or that experiential content, unlike belief-content, is
rich, or analog, or fine-grained, or situation-dependent (see, e.g., Dretske 1981;
Tye 2006; Kelly 2001; Siegel 2011), or that it has a distinctive phenomenology,
namely a phenomenology that is unlike that of belief (see, e.g., Peacocke 2001; Tye
1995; 2000). The fact that these arguments centrally draw a contrast between
experience and belief makes it unlikely that the (content-) nonconceptualists who
present and defend these arguments have no interest in establishing a contrastive
claim concerning the contents of the relevant states.
It is possible, however, for a more modest nonconceptualist to ignore the
contrastive claims that usually motivate arguments for nonconceptualism and
focus entirely on experience. Such a modest nonconceptualist aims only to argue
for the (noncomparative) conclusion that b) some of the constituents of experi-
ential contents are not concepts, and as far as she’s concerned, the argument
from fineness of grain discussed in this paper does a fine job of making the case
for (modest) nonconceptualism. Indeed, my claims in this paper do not under-
mine nonconceptualism so (modestly) construed. The modest nonconceptualist
ought to notice, however, that endorsing RC as part of an argument from
fineness of grain commits her to endorsing further claims about the constituents
of belief-contents. That is because the very reasoning (using RC) with which the
modest nonconceptualist reaches her modest conclusion also supports the claim
that belief-contents are partly nonconceptual. Whether or not she cares about
belief contents at all, a modest nonconceptualist is nonetheless committed to a
substantial claim about them, which in turn will have implications for the truth
of comparative claims.
Standard nonconceptualist arguments therefore suggest that nonconceputalists
are for the most part concerned with questions about the nature of both
experiential and belief-contents and whether they are contents of the same kind.
This means that nonconceptualists who use RC should indeed worry about its
implication for the constituents of belief. If RC entails not merely that experiential
contents are partly nonconceptual but that belief-contents are partly nonconcep-
tual as well, RC fails to support the case for nonconceptualism in the comparative
sense. Modest nonconceptualists can use RC to support nonconceptualism as they
construe it, but their commitment to the truth of RC commits them to the truth
of unexpected claims about belief-contents—that they are partly nonconceptual—
and about how they do not differ from experiential contents—belief-contents are
partly nonconceptual in just the way that experiential contents are.
3.2 Demonstratives vs. Definite Descriptions
The case made here assumes—explicitly so, see Section 2.3—that there are three
ways for a subject to represent a fine-grained perceptual property conceptually:
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either she will do so using a general perceptual non-deferential concept, or
using a deferential concept, or using a perceptual demonstrative concept. As
mentioned several times, RC in its original form is a condition on both general
non-deferential perceptual concepts and on perceptual demonstrative concepts,
though it’s not a condition on deferential perceptual concepts. But a noncon-
ceptualist may claim that a fourth possibility has been ignored: that a subject
could represent a fine-grained perceptual property using a definite description.
Lisa could represent green17 as ‘the artist’s least favourite shade’; or as ‘the shade
I singled out the first time I looked at the canvas’, and so forth. Consider, then,
a case in which Lisa while attending to green17 utters the demonstrative sentence:
(S1) This is the perfect shade for my poster.
Nonconceptualists can claim that the belief expressed by (S1) is not a genuine
demonstrative belief but is rather a thought whose first constituent is a ‘covert’
definite description, such as ‘the shade I am attending to’. Descriptions like
these, it would seem, can be wholly conceptual, and they can be used by
subjects to pick out fine-grained properties that they may not be able to
re-identify. Nonconceptualists are now in a position to deny what I claimed
was true in Section 2.1: they can deny that endorsing RC will entail that some
constituents of beliefs will not be concepts. Importantly, they can simultane-
ously deny that fine-grained shades are represented conceptually in the way
they are represented in thought. Indeed, it seems quite unlikely for green17 to
be represented in Lisa’s experience by a description like ‘the shade I am attend-
ing to now’. The definite description makes reference to what is being attended
to, and it is unlikely that the concept of ATTENTION could itself be a con-
stituent of the content of experience. The argument from fineness of grain can
now go through. Green17 is represented in Lisa’s experience nonconceptually but
it is represented in her belief by a complex (conceptual) description. Experience
does have some constituents that are of a different kind from the constituents
of belief after all.
This nonconceptualist rejoinder is problematic for at least two reasons. First,
nonconceptualists themselves believe that it is unlikely for a subject’s experience
to represent fine-grained properties by deploying the concept ATTENTION (or
any other related concept). This is because it seems possible, nonconceptualists
argue, for a subject’s experience to represent, e.g., green17 without possessing
the general concepts involved in this sort of description, such as the concept
ATTENTION or SHADE (see for instance Peacocke 2001). But if we assume
nonconceptualists are right here, what might they say about such a subject were
she to think about a particular, fine-grained shade represented in her experience?
How is that fine-grained shade represented in the subject’s belief that it’s pretty,
say?31 The fine-grained properties, in such a case, cannot be represented using a
description such as ‘the shade I am attending to’—since the subject does not
possess that concept—and these properties cannot be represented by perceptual
demonstrative concepts or perceptual non-deferential concepts—for reasons dis-
cussed earlier in the paper. This appears to leave only one possibility: the
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constituent of her belief that represents the fine-grained shade is not a concept.32
Belief-contents are partly nonconceptual.
But there is another reason to be deeply sceptical of an appeal to hidden
descriptions. The plausibility of such an appeal depends on the plausibility of
the claim that sentences like (S1), uttered while attention is being directed at a
particular shade, express beliefs that are devoid of any demonstrative constitu-
ents.33 There is nothing inherently wrong with claiming that sentences of a
natural language that share a similar surface structure may in fact express beliefs
with different constituents and internal structures. However, positing differing
internal structure ought to be done for good explanatory reason. Imagine, for
instance, that Lisa utters sentence (S1) a few hours after having left the painting
studio, while thinking back to the shade.
(S1) This is the perfect shade for my poster.
Lisa, both while attending to the shade and afterwards, utters the exact same
sentence, however, we have reason to think that the beliefs expressed by the
two sentences are not the same. Indeed, we have reason to think that Lisa’s
demonstrative expression, uttered outside the studio, may not express the
demonstrative concept we assumed her demonstrative expression expressed
earlier. This is because, while looking at the paint drop, Lisa’s expression
refers to the shade by virtue of her attending to the relevant property while
experiencing it. But, having left, her thinking back about the shade is not
mediated by attention to a currently experienced property. In fact, since by
stipulation, Lisa cannot re-identify the shade, she is not remembering the shade
and attending to her stored memory representation of it. This gives us reason
to think that though the demonstrative expressions may sound the same when
uttered, they may in fact express different concepts. In other words, we have
reason to think that the demonstrative expression in the second uttering
of (S1) may not express a genuine demonstrative concept, but may instead
express a description such as THE SHADE I ATTENDED TO EARLIER.
Similarly, when Russell argues that sentences of the form ‘An A is F’, or ‘The
A is F’ actually have complex hidden logical structures, he does so because
positing such structures does quite a bit of explanatory work. Indeed, it
enables him to explain how sentences like ‘Pegasus does not exist’ can be
meaningful without committing him to the claim that certain expressions refer
to nonexistent objects. And notoriously, it also enables him to explain how
certain a posteriori identity claims, such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, can be
cognitively significant.
By contrast, it is not clear that the nonconceptualist has good explanatory
reason for maintaining that sentences like (S1) uttered while attention is being
directed at an experienced property nonetheless do not express a genuine
demonstrative thought. If the only reason supporting the nonconceptualist’s claim
is that her claim is compatible with the truth of nonconceptualism, then the
argument from fineness of grain has not provided us with any non-question-
begging reason to become nonconceptualists.
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This paper has argued that even if the so-called re-identification condition isn’t
weakened or modified, still the argument from fineness of grain fails to make the
case for nonconceptualism. If RC holds, then some (demonstrative) beliefs will
have nonconceptual constituents. And if some beliefs have nonconceptual con-
stituents, then the argument from fineness of grain hasn’t succeeded in showing
that experience is unlike belief in that it (and not belief) is partly nonconceptual.
The upshot for the nonconceptualist is this: either she should reformulate the
fineness of grain argument without appealing to RC at all, or she should give
up on the fineness of grain argument, despite its prominence, and attempt to
support nonconceptualism in some other way.34
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NOTES
1 See Dokic and Pacherie 2001; Tye 1995; 2000; 2006; Peacocke 2001, and for discussion
Bermúdez and Cahen 2008, Chuard 2006.
2 This is, as mentioned, a rough characterization. For a qualified one, see Section 1.2.
3 Such as, e.g., arguments from richness—see Tye 2000, Dretske 1995.
4 The terminology is from Heck 2000.
5 In the paper, capital letters will be used for concepts to emphasize that there need
be no commitment, in these discussions, to claims about the ontology of concepts. Whether
concepts turn out to be abstract constituents of propositions or mental representations, the
arguments in these debates can be deployed.
6 Despite acknowledging that the debates are logically independent, authors such as
Bermúdez (2007) have argued that they are importantly related. Whether or not Bermú-
dez is right should have no bearing on the central thesis of this paper.
7 It is also worth noting that it is possible for a content-conceptualist to claim that a
concept is a constituent of a subject’s experience even if the subject in question does not
possess the concept, i.e., cannot token a belief which takes the concept as a constituent. See,
e.g., Byrne 2005.
8 See also, Bermúdez 2007. Such projects further assume that beliefs lack characteristic
phenomenology—though it should be noted that it is by no means obviously true that there
is no cognitive phenomenology (see Bayne and Montague’s (2011) anthology for discussion).
9 Worries about the debate so construed are discussed in some detail in Section 3.2.
10 Note that the argument from fineness of grain cannot make the case that the content
of experience is wholly nonconceptual. The fact that it is partly nonconceptual, however,
is enough to warrant a nonconceptualist conclusion: that experience and belief are states of
a different kind.
11 The condition is sometimes stated as a condition on concept possession (including by
Kelly 2001, and Dokic and Pacherie 2001). But possessing a concept, on even the most
minimalist construal, is to be able to token a belief with that concept as a constituent. Our
concern here, however, is whether concepts can be constituents of experience.
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12 Chuard’s explicit statement of this ‘strong’ RC, only includes conditions (i)–(iii),
though he clearly thinks it includes conditions (iv) and (v) as well. See Chuard 2006: 195
(notes 6 and 7).
13 The relevant perceptual properties are properties of objects that can be represented—
accurately or not—by subjects in experience and in thought.
14 Chuard calls this type of recognition de dicto re-identification and contrasts it with
de re re-identification which doesn’t require that subjects be aware that the property
they’ve just identified was the same one they identified earlier (2006: 168–9).
15 Note that requirements (iv) and (v) may be intimately related: it may be to ensure
that condition (iv) is met—that subjects can re-identify properties such as shade only
based on their experience of that shade and memory—that, as (v) states, an interval of
time between t and t + 1 is required. After all, insisting that there be an interval of time
during which the subject S has no experience of the relevant property will make it less
likely that S is re-identifying the shade at t + 1 merely based on the tracking of its location
(and not based on the experience of the property itself). Still, merely requiring an interval
of no experience does not guarantee that the subject’s re-identification of green17 at t + 1
will in fact only be based on her experience of the shade and memory: as described
earlier, it is possible for Lisa to memorize the location of the drop, and therefore to
re-identify the shade after an interval of no experience. So both conditions (iv) and (v)
need to be met, for a subject to really meet RC.
16 The importance of memory storage is made explicit in Dokic and Pacherie 2001
who claim that it makes thinking (i.e., inferences) possible; and by Chuard 2006 who
criticizes this feature of RC specifically in his thought-experiments (Chuard 2006: 183–4,
189–90, 192–3).
17 Presumably, RC doesn’t apply to concepts that pick out perceptual properties that
cannot be, as a matter of principle, re-identified, such as THIS INSTANTENOUS OBJECT.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for the European Journal of Philosophy for pointing this
out.
18 I am merely claiming here that RC is not a plausible condition on deferential
concepts—something which Kelly himself notes (2001). Importantly, I am not claiming
that all non-deferential concepts therefore must meet RC. It is indeed possible for an
expert to have non-deferential concepts of unperceivable properties (like being just, or
being God). I come back to deferential concepts in Section 1.3.
19 Notice that the argument from fineness of grain shows, at most, that experience is
partly nonconceptual—as opposed to wholly nonconceptual. Indeed, even if it turns out
that fine-grained properties must be represented in experience nonconceptually, it isn’t
usually argued, in discussion of the argument, that experience represents fine-grained
properties only. It remains a possibility, then, that experience could represent coarse-
grained properties (like being a tree or being a car) conceptually.
20 He writes ‘it’s possible to imagine, and we may even be capable of, making
perceptual discriminations in cases in which we fail to satisfy the criteria on possessing
demonstrative concepts for the things discriminated’ (2001: 402–3).
21 Of course, Pacherie and Dokic go on to argue that the demonstrative state-
conceptualist move fails.
22 This is McDowell’s (1994) strategy among others (Brewer 2005, etc.)
23 Though he admits he isn’t presenting any ‘conclusive arguments’ for that conclusion,
merely a number of considerations in its favour.
24 The assumption that there are only three possible ways of representing a fine-
grained property conceptually can be questioned (see Section 3).
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25 This amounts to eliminating requirements (iv) and (v) from the statement of RC.
26 I leave aside here the question of whether concepts form a natural kind—Machery
2009 has recently argued that they do not. This is compatible with the claims made in this
paper.
27 I do not mean to suggest that RC is the only plausible characterization of concepts.
The aim of this paper, however, is to argue that RC, which plays such a central role in
arguments of fineness of grain, does not actually entail the truth of nonconceptualism.
28 Levine references Pylyshyn 2003, who also uses the pointer analogy in discussing
the early visual system.
29 Clearly, claiming that RC isn’t in fact a condition on demonstrative concepts (à la
Chuard) isn’t an option. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, such a move undermines the
argument from fineness of grain by leaving open the possibility that subjects represent
fine-grained properties in experience using demonstrative concepts. And remember that the
aim of this paper is to argue that even if RC remains a condition on demonstrative
concepts (something which critics of the argument usually deny with devastating
implications for the nonconceptualist), the argument from fineness of grain still fails to
make the case for nonconceptualism.
30 Thanks to an anonymous referee for the European Journal of Philosophy for pressing
me on this point.
31 Presumably, such a subject could not think that this is the perfect shade for my poster,
since she cannot think with the concept SHADE. She would presumably then not utter
(S1) either, but instead may utter: (S2) This is pretty.
32 I do assume here that the only remaining possibility is that the relevant fine-grained
property would be represented by something that is not a concept. Now it is actually
possible for someone to insist that, since the subject lacks a concept to pick out the
fine-grained property, the subject simply cannot think about the property. (Thanks to an
anonymous referee for the European Journal of Philosophy for pointing this out). When this
subject utters the demonstrative sentence (S2) This is pretty (see note 31), she simply fails
to express a thought that is about the determinate shade of green. However, it is not clear
what non-question-begging reasons we would have for thinking that the subject fails to
think about the relevant shade.
33 The definite description will contain some indexicals, of course, as in ‘the shade I
am perceiving now.’
34 Many thanks to Peter Carruthers, Georges Rey, Ryan Millsap, and an anonymous
referee for the European Journal of Philosophy for their insightful suggestions. Thanks also
to the audience of the APA session during which I presented an earlier version of this
paper and especially to Philippe Chuard for being a most helpful commentator.
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